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MAKING RULES: AN INTRODUCTION 
Steven Croley* 
RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND 
MAKE POLICY. By Cornelius M. Kerwin. Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 321. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $21.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Whit Stillman's recent film, Barcelona, the buffoonish and 
not-so-well-read naval attache, Fred, questions his shy-but-
sophisticated cousin, Ted, about several review essays he had just 
read, triggering the following amusing exchange: 
Fred: Maybe you can clarify something for me. Since I've been wait-
ing for the fleet, I've read a lot. 
Ted: Really? 
Fred: And one of the things that keeps cropping up is this about 
"subtext." Plays and those songs - they all have subtext, which I 
take to mean a hidden message or import of some kind. So "subtext" 
we know. But what do you call the message or meaning that's right 
there on the surface, completely open and obvious? They never talk 
about that. What do you call what's above the subtext? 
Ted: . . . . The text. · 
Fred: Okay. That's right! But they never talk about that.1 
Rulemaking, by Neil Kerwin,2 offers much text worth talking 
about. Indeed, Rulemaking, billed largely as an introduction to a 
crucial yet underappreciated facet of lawmaking, intended for stu-
dents and practitioners of public administration, political science, 
and public policy (pp. xi-xii) - Kerwin could have justifiably added 
law to the list - is mostly text; most of its message is "right there 
on the surface." By design, the book is part primer, part literature 
review, part research project, and part call to scholarly arms. 
Though not without its imperfections, it succeeds on all of these 
fronts: Rulemaking is not only a helpful introduction to the "hows" 
(note its subtitle) and "whys" of rulemaking, but also a significant 
contribution to the scholarly literature on rulemaking. That contri-
bution is not the only reason administrative law scholars should re-
sist any temptation to pass over an introductory book published by 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. Michigan, 1988; J.D. Yale, 
1991; M.A. {Politics) Princeton, 1994. - Ed. I am grateful to Cary Coglianese, Kyle Logue, 
and Stephen Williams for helpful comments on this review, and to Stephanie Gold for valua-
ble research assistance. 
1. BARCELONA (Fme Line Features 1994). 
2. Dean and Professor, School of Public Affairs, American University. 
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a nonacademic press, however, for Rulemaking's subtext reveals 
something about what the most fruitful future work in the field 
might look like. 
I. · SoME CoNTEXT: Rui.EMAKING 
Rulemaking by federal administrative agencies is one of the 
most important lawmaking functions of the U.S. government. 
Kerwin thus rightly dispenses with tentativeness: 
Between Congress and the people it represents and the goals we seek 
to achieve when a law is written stands a crucial intermediate process. 
We have come to rely on rulemaking to an increasing degree to define 
the substance of public programs. It determines, to a very large ex-
tent, the specific legal obligations we bear as a society.3 
As Kerwin explains, rulemaking is the most important device fed-
eral agencies use to specify, clarify, and refine Congress's work-
product - in short, to finish the task of legislating. This is true not 
only for especially broad, open-ended pieces of legislation. Even 
when Congress speaks at considerable length and with considerable 
specificity, agencies must engage in substantial statutory gap-filling. 
For example, as Kerwin notes, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
19904 required at least several hundred new regulations (by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's (EPA)·count) before it could be-
come operational (p. 2). Measured qualitatively as well, agency 
rules constitute a genus of public law of the highest importance.s 
Accordingly, Kerwin seeks, above all else, to generate increased at-
tention to this dimension of American governance6 - to an institu-
tion Kenneth Culp Davis famously described as "one of the greatest 
inventions of modern government."7 But first, just what is that 
invention? 
Rulemaking takes several forms. According to section 553 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 ("APA" or "Act")B -
3. P. 2; see also p. 85 ("[W]hat goes on during and emerges from rulemaking is at least 
equal in importance to any other element of our public policy process."). 
4. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
5. Orders, ·the product of agency adjudication processes, constitute the other main genus 
of agency decisionmaking. Adjudication is conducted according to §§ 554, 556, and 557 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA}, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988), which 
specify agencies' formal hearing processes and require a separation of powers between an 
agency's executive-prosecutorial and its judicial arms. Whereas rulemaking resembles deci-
sionmaking according to the legislative model, adjudication resembles decisionmaking ac-
cording to the judicial model. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
216-17 (1988} (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing rulemaking and adjudication). 
6. At several points, Kerwin suggests that the success of the American political system 
turns on the success of rulemaking. For example: "[T]he health of our democracy now 
hinges in no small part on how well rulemaking works." P. 293. 
7. KENNEm CuLP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970). 
8. Section 553 provides, in relevant part: 
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an act that serves as the "constitution" of the administrative state9 
- agencies authorized by statute to issue "legislative"10 rules with-
out first providing a hearing on a record can do so simply by follow-
ing three basic steps. First, the agency must apprise potentially 
interested parties that it is contemplating adopting some proposed 
rule. Second, the agency must allow those parties an opportunity to 
respond to the agency's proposed rule. Third, after receiving any 
such responses and generating ·whatever additional information the 
agency thinks necessary to consider, the agency must promulgate, at 
least thirty days before the rule is to take effect, a "concise general 
statement" explaining why the rule took the final form it did.11 
Thus do agencies engage in "ordinary" or "informal" or "notice-
and-comment" rulemaking. 
Ordinary rulemaking is distinguished first from "formal" 
rulemaking. Tue words "hearing" and "record" (more precisely, 
the legal equivalents of these terms12) in an agency's statute triggers 
form~ rulemaking.13 In .the formal rulemaking mode - employed 
only for limited categories of agency decisions, such as ratemaking 
and decisions dealing with food additives - an agency must con-
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter • . • • The notice shall include -
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the tenns or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved •..• 
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, 
or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of 
the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a con-
cise general statement of their basis and purpose. 
5 u.s.c. § 553 (1988). 
9. To push the analogy further than it can probably go, if the APA is the constitution of 
the administrative state, then its legislative history, see SENATE COMM. ON nm JuoICIARY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1946), constitutes its convention debates; the Attorney General's Committee Report, 
S. Doc. No. 8, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), its Federalist; and the Walter-Logan bill, S. 915, 
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), its anti-federalist 
alternative. 
10. Section 553's notice and comment processes are not required for "procedural" or 
"interpretive" rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1988); see, e.g., Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of 
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (distinguishing legislative or substantive rules 
from "interpretive rules" or "general statements of policy"). A "rule" for the purposes of the 
APA is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular appli-
cability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or 
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(4) (1988). . . 
11. Often, the second stage involves successive rounds of notice and comment. See, e.g., 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983) (approxi-
mately 60 rounds of notice and comment before promulgation of final rule). 
12. See United States v. Florida E. Co!!St Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (holding that mere 
appearance of words "after hearing" in agency's statute is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
trigger formal rulemaking under§§ 553(c), 556-557). 
13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). 
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duct a hearing during which parties may provide testimony, present 
e.vidence taken on a record, and cross-examine adverse witnesses.14 
If the agency deems that prejudice will not result from the written 
submission of evidence, it can conduct formal rulemaking, in effect, 
through the mail,15 in which case formal rulemaking partially re-
sembles informal rulemaking. Even here, however, evidence is re-
corded, and all other requirements of formal rulemaking still apply. 
As Kerwin explains, agencies' rulemaking obligations -
whether in the formal or informal mode - do not always appear on 
the face of the virtually unamended APA.16 First, some of those 
obligations have been identified by federal courts in the course of 
interpreting the Act's provisions. For example, courts have held 
that section 553's "notice" must explain the general factual or other 
bases on which a proposed rule rests, in order to give potentially 
interested parties a fair opportunity to respond with comments, and 
furthermore that 553's "concise general statement" cannot be so 
concise or general that courts cannot effectively review an agency's 
final rule.17 
14. 5 u.s.c. §§ 556-557 (1988). 
15. 5 u.s.c. § 556(d) (1988). 
16. P. 55. The core rulemaking provisions of the APA remain the same today as they 
appeared in 1946, though the Act was recodified in 1966 as part of Title 5 (specifically, chap-
ters 5 ("Administrative Procedure") and 7 ("Judicial Review") of Part 1, "The Agencies 
Generally," of Title 5, "Government Organization and Employees," of the U.S. Code). In 
that same year, the old § 3 was rewritten to become the Freedom of Infonnation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). Chapter 5 
was amended in 1974 to house the Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988)), and again in 1976 to house the Sunshine 
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1241-46 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b 
(1988)). 
Since 1946, Congress has made only two substantive changes to the core provisions of the 
APA governing administrative procedure and judicial review. Along with the passage of the 
Sunshine Act in 1976, Congress amended§ 557(d) -which governs fonnal adjudication and 
fonnal rulemaking processes - to forbid ex parte communications in fonnal evidentiary 
proceedings. Congress amended §§ 702 and 703 that same year to eliminate the sovereign 
immunity defense in a certain class of cases. For a helpful overview of the stability of the 
APA, which offers explanations for its durability that resonate with Kerwin's, see William H. 
Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. L. REv. 235 (1986). 
17. See, e.g., Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994); American Medical Assn. 
v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 767-69 (7th Cir.1989) (explaining principles relevant in deter-
mining whether notice was sufficient); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 
838 F.2d 1224, 1242 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining "logical outgrowth" test to detennine whether 
notice was sufficient), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 888, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988); Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Castle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 & n.11, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruck-
elshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that infonnation on which agency bases 
rule cannot be known only to agency), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
Although courts have had to give meaning to the non-self-defining vocabulary of § 553 -
"notice," "opportunity to participate," and "concise general statement," for example -
courts do not impose upon agencies procedural requirements beyond those found in the 
APA, unless Congress has done so. See Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (explaining that courts cannot impose 
upon agencies decisionmaking procedures above what APA requires); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 
May 1995] Making Rules 1515 
More important, the other two branches have supplemented 
agencies' rulemaking obligations by subsequent legislation and ex-
ecutive order. Sometimes these supplemental requirements are di-
rected to particular agencies, as in the case of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act,1s which requires the EPA to develop rules governing 
the testing of substances based on considerations of costs and a 
range of specified health risks (p. 58). Other statutes supplement-
ing the APA's rulemaking requirements apply to all agencies, such 
as the National Environmental Policy Act,19 the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act,20 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.21 These acts require 
rulemakers to assess the environmental impact of certain rules, de-
velop information on the paperwork burden that will accompany 
rules, and reduce the burden of rules on small entities, respectively. 
In addition to such legislation, executive. orders requiring specific 
consideration of the costs and benefits of proposed major rules sig-
nificantly add to rulemakers' obligations.22 
541 F.2d 1, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that where statute does not indicate otherwise, 
infonnal rulemaking procedures are conducted under § 553), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976); see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). So while commentators are in one sense correct that the 
APA has proved resistant to statutory amendment in part because of subsequent judicial 
interpretation, the point that Congress has not amended the APA because the judiciary has 
done so can be overstated. Judicial interpretation of key tenns of the APA does not distin-
guish the APA from many other statutes that become operational only after judicial interpre-
tation of key tenns. To say as Kerwin does (pp. 52, 55-56, 71-72) that, in part due to judicial 
interpretation of the APA, rulemaking no longer looks like what the framers of the Act had 
envisioned raises the question of what the APA envisioned in the first place, which is just the 
question that the courts interpreting the Act aim to answer. 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, 4361-4370d (1988 & Supp V 1993). 
20. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These acts do not change the essential 
procedures that rulemaking agencies employ as much as they require agencies, when doing 
their own evaluations of proposed rules, to consider certain specific consequences of those 
rules. Kerwin thus appropriately calls these statutes "infonnation statutes." Pp. 59-60. 
22. Kerwin mentions President Reagan's famous executive orders, Exec. Order No. 
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 
C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), which he argues evolved from an execu-
tive order of President Carter, Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Pp. 62, 125. After Rulemaking was written, President 
Clinton issued an executive order, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. V 1993), which fonnally rescinds Reagan's orders but retains many of 
their essential requirements, such as consideration of the costs and benefits of major rules 
and coordination among rulemaking agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. Proposed legis-
lation currently before Congress would bring back some of the specifics of President 
Reagan's executive orders. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
In contrast to judicial interpretation of the APA's language, and to a greater extent than 
the statutes mentioned immediately above, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text, 
executive orders have changed rulemakingprocesses in a fundamental way. Under Executive 
Order 12,866, for example, agencies are required, among other things: to submit to the Of-
fice of Infonnation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) plans setting forth an agency's major 
rulemaking agenda, to provide OIRA with the draft text of major rules, to provide OIRA 
with infonnation animating the agency's decisionmaking rationale, including some form of 
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The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 199()23 also applies to agen-
cies across the board, authorizing but not requiring agencies to or-
ganize and conduct negotiations among parties interested in a 
particular rule. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act essentially codi-
fied and routinized a practice agencies sometimes employed to gen-
erate a consensus among interested parties prior to promulgating a 
proposed rule. In a negotiated rulemaking, the agency convenes a 
committee composed of representatives of parties whose interests 
are implicated by the rule an agency seeks to develop.24 Along with 
the agency, and with the help of an outside facilitator, the commit-
tee members negotiate in an attempt to formulate a proposed rule 
that all find acceptable. Ordinary notice-and-comment processes 
commence once participants in the negotiated rulemaking have 
come to a consensus about the form of a proposed rule. But, at 
least according to negotiated rulemaking's proponents, ordinary 
notice-and-comment proceeds more quickly and with less conflict 
than it would have in the absence of prior negotiations.25 
cost-benefit analysis, and - once a rule has been published in the Federal Register - to 
identify for the public the changes between the draft rule submitted to OIRA and the final 
action taken. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 4(c), 6, 3 C.F.R. at 642-48. Note, however, that 
executive orders are largely exhortatory for independent, as opposed to executive, agencies. 
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291 § l(d), 3 C.F.R. at 128; Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(b), 9, 3 
C.F.R. at 641, 649; Exec. Order No. 12,838 § 5, 3 C.F.R. 590 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 
§ 14 (Supp. V 1993). For a thoughtful investigation of the significance of Executive Order 
12,866, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 1 (1995). 
23. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. V 1993). 
24. Tue convening of a regulatory negotiating committee is carried out pursuant to the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988). Passed in 1972, the 
FACA governs reliance by the President and by agencies upon outside advisors. Like the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Congress passed the FACA in an effort to routinize informal 
practices that agencies had already developed. Like the Sunshine Act, the FACA was 
designed in part to open those practices up to public oversight and participation. In brief, the 
FACA requires that an advisory comII1ittee be established only after a determination that the 
public interest so requires, that every advisory committee have a clearly defined purpose and 
limited life-span, that every advisory comII1ittee have a membership representing diverse 
points of view, and that advisory committees' activities be subject to review by agencies, the 
President, the Congress, and the public. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5, 9-11, 14 (1988). 
25. In explaining negotiated rulemaking, Kerwin borrows from Philip Harter, who en-
couraged its use in the years surrounding the passage of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act and 
has participated in many negotiated rulemakings. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regula-
tions: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. LJ. 1 (1982). As Kerwin notes (p. 185), negotiated 
rulemaking can be traced back to the collaborative rulemaking processes of the New Deal, 
which the Supreme Court eventually struck down as unconstitutional delegations of legisla-
tive power. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
As Kerwin also explains (p. 185), some four decades later Secretary of Labor John Dunlop 
encouraged the use of consensus-building techniques during the development of rules gov-
erning workplace safety. For a helpful treatment of negotiated rulemaking as of 1986, see 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recom-
mendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 14 GEO. L.J, 1625 (1986); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice, 5 J. POLY. ANALYSIS & MoMT. 482 
(1986). See generally DAVID M. I'RrrzKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, ADMINISTRATIVE CON· 
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"Hybrid rulemaking" constitutes yet a fourth species of 
rulemaking - "hybrid" because this mode is more formal than or-
dinary rulemaking but less so than formal rulemaking.26 Like nego-
tiated rulemaking, hybrid rulemaking involves legislative 
supplementation to section 553's requirements. Unlike negotiated 
rulemaking, however, hybrid ;rulemaking statutes selectively apply 
to particular agencies. Typically, hybri4 rulemaking requires those 
agencies to conduct public hearings in the course of developing a 
rule. This effort to expand opportunities for outside participation 
in rulemaking peaked in the early 1970s, after which time hybrid 
rulemaking lost its popularity. Because formal rulemaking and hy-
brid rulemaking are not widely used today,27 and because negoti-
ated rulemaking's use so far' has been limited, most of Rulemaking 
focuses, implicitly, on section 553, notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.28 
This is not to imply that the dominant species of rulemaking 
started with the APA. To the contrary, the APA's rulemaking pro-
visions constituted more of an endorsement than a creation of 
rulemaking. As Kerwin explains, rulemaking extends back to the 
first Congress (p. 45), though of course large-scale bureaucracies 
with substantial organizational resources did not emerge until the 
end of the nineteenth century. In fact, one of the virtues of 
Rulemaking, even for the initiated, is the supply of little-known 
· facts and anecdotes Kerwin provides in explaining how rulemaking 
was an important government function before the passage of the 
APA.29 He mentions, for example, that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) promulgated numerous important rules in the 
years immediately following the passage of the Motor Carrier Act 
of 1935.30 And while Kerwin carefully outlines the history of 
rulemaking - explaining the American Bar Association's strong 
resistance to increased reliance on rulemaking during the New 
FERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RuLEMAKING SOURCEBOOK {1990). Kerwin himself has 
undertaken a study of negotiated rulemaking by the EPA. See infra note 46. 
While most agencies are authorized to use negotiated rulemaking as they see fit, Kerwin 
explains that occasionally agency use of federal advisory committees is required for the de-
velopment of certain rules, as under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-
l{b)(3)(B) (1988), for example. P. 68. 
26. See generally Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 401 {1975). 
27. See, e.g., BENJAMIN w. Mimz & NANCY G. MlLLER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
OF nm U.S., A GUIDE ro FEDERAL AGENCY RuLEMAKING 3-5 {2d ed. 1991). 
28. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE SouRCEBOOK 47 (2d ed. 1992) (most rulemaking governed by § 553). 
29. Some of these Kerwin mines from the U.S. ArroRNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON AD-
MIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, s. Doc. No. 
8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. {1941). 
30. Pub. L No. 74-255, 49 Stat 543 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1988)). 
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Deal, Roosevelt's veto of the Walter-Logan Bill,31 and the eventual 
expansion of rulemaking during the 1960s and 1970s - he helpfully 
points out that large-scale rulemaking even in complex scientific 
areas predates the 1960s (pp. 12-13). 
As Kerwin acknowledges, Rulemaking is not the first book to 
treat the topic (p. xii), nor are more complete historical sketches 
unavailable.32 Gary Bryner's Bureaucratic Discretion,33 for exam-
ple, focuses on rulemaking in an attempt to ascertain the extent to 
which bureaucratic decisionmakers' own goals shape regulatory 
policy decisions. Wesley Magat, Alan Krupnick, and Winston Har-
rington's Rules in the Making,34 for another example, provides a 
statistical study of rulemaking in the context of EPA effluent stan-
dards. And William West's Administrative Rulemaking: Politics 
and Processes35 explores rulemaking by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. 36 Beyond these, numerous articles by administrative law 
scholars, as well as publications and reports by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States {ACUS), treat various aspects of 
agency rulemaking.37 
II. RULEMAKING ON RULEMAKING 
So what does Kerwin contribute, besides an accessible explana-
tion of the different species of rulemaking and an interesting histor-
ical summary of this important governmental function? For one 
thing, Rulemaking is broad in scope. Unlike most if not all of the 
prior work on rulemaking, Kerwin's book generalizes across time, 
across agencies, and across statutory programs. Three themes tie 
Kenvin's holistic treatment of rulemaking together: information, 
31. As Kerwin ·explains, the-Walter-Logan Bill of 1940 would have eliminated agencies' 
informal rulemaking powers in favor of more formal adjudication powers. Pp. 49, 169. 
32. See, e.g., MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSmON (1993). 
33. GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION (1987). 
34. WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR (1986). 
35. WILLIAM F. WEST, AoMINISTRAnVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 
(1985). 
36. While the literature is not voluminous, other significant works include Ross E. 
CHErr, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS (1990) (comparing private and public organizations' 
development of rules); A. LEE FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS (4th ed. 1989) (taking 
rulemaking as focal point of "subsystem" politics); JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE 
RuLEMAKING (1983) (legal treatise on rulemaking). 
37. Significant scholarly articles on the topic include, just for example, Harold H. Bruff, 
Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 533 (1989); James 
V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 
(1979); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Ru/emaking, 41 
ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995). The ACUS is an important catalyst for the study of rulemaking. 
In Rulemaking, Kerwin frequently relies on ACUS's A GumE TO FEDERAL AGENCY 
RULEMAKING, supra note 27; see also FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28. 
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participation, and accountability. These constitute, according to 
Kerwin, the "core elements of rulemaking" (p. 52). Although he 
does not put it in exactly these terms, Kerwin's message about the 
core elements of rulemaking can be summarized as follows. 
Rulemaking is by and large an institution to facilitate the neces-
sary exchange of information between agencies and outside parties. 
Agencies, however "expert" they may be, are not omniscient. They 
need information to generate rules. Often, outside parties possess 
information relevant to a rule an agency must develop. Rulemak-
ing processes provide a mechanism for the transfer. 
And the exchange is bilateral. When an agency initially solicits 
comments during the first notice-and-comment phase of informal 
rulemaking, this very act discloses to outside parties information 
about the agency's agenda and the direction in which the agency 
might proceed. The agency's solicitation invites interested parties 
- including other agencies, federal or state, as well as private 
groups - to provide the agency with information about the form its 
proposed rule should take. Parties respond by answering the invita-
tions, thus supplying the agency with needed information. The 
agency further reveals information in subsequent rounds of notice 
and comment, as the agency's information forms the basis of its re-
sponses to the comments it receives. Based on the agency's re-
sponses to the parties' responses, the parties come forth with 
additional information, hoping to shape the agency's decisionmak-
ing yet further. And so on. After the fact, agencies disclose still 
more information upon providing the requisite concise general 
statement setting forth the agency's rationale for the final rule 
developed. 
Information is thus a prerequisite for participation in rulemak-
ing processes - hence the link between Kerwin's first two themes. 
In the first instance, potential participants must know which pro-
posed rules an agency is contemplating. Kerwin explains that the 
Federal Register, in which agencies promulgate notices of proposed 
rulemakings, serv~s as a kind of regulatory bulletin apprising read-
ers of what agencies intend to do.38 No less importantly, potential 
38. Pp. 63-64; see also MlNTz & Miu.ER supra note 27, at 132-34. Passed in 1934, the 
Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 90-620, 82 Stat. 1273 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. 
§§ 1501-1511 (1988)), requires publication of certain regulatory documents in the Federal 
Register and permanent codification of rules in the Code of Federal Regulations. Pursuant to 
the Act, the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register prescribes, with presidential 
approval, regulations for carrying out the Act Because these regulations affect the fonn of 
Federal Register publications, they have a significant impact on the agencies' disclosure of 
information during rulemaking processes. As Kerwin notes, for example, the Administrative 
Committee's regulations require that preambles accompany all proposed and final rules pub-
lished in the Federal Register and that such preambles "infonn the reader, who is not an 
expert in the subject area, of the basis and purpose for the rule or proposal." 1 C.F.R. 
§ 18.12(a) (1995). This means that preambles for major rules often are longer than the rules 
themselves, running for several hundred pages. 
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participants must have some capacity to develop information upon 
which to base comments responding to the agency's proposed rule. 
The possession or lack of information, in other words, effectively 
circumscribes the set of parties "eligible" to participate in the devel-
opment of rules.39 As a practical matter,4o only parties with infor-
mation bearing on a proposed rule are eligible to participate in 
rule making. . 
Very often, outside parties do have information bearing upon a 
proposed rule and thus do participate in rulemaking. Thankfully 
so, according to Kerwin, for participation by outside parties en-
hances the poJ!t~cal legitimacy of authoritative rules developed by 
officials not directly accountable to the citizenry.41 Kerwin's analy-
sis thins here, however, for he uses the term "public participation" 
in two very different ways. Sometimes, Kerwin uses public partici-
pation to refer to participation in rulemaking by representatives 
(actual or putative) of the public, or at least of broad-based inter-
ests - typically, the intended beneficiaries of the legislation upon 
which a rule will be based, as opposed to those who will most di-
rectly bear its costs.42 Elsewhere, however, he uses public partici-
pation interchangeably with participation by "regulated parties," 
not representatives of the larger public at all.43 
But one can, and should, distinguish between participation by 
representatives of broad-based interests and participation by repre-
sentatives of regulated parties, for the two have different implica-
tions for the political legitimacy of rulemaking. After all, 
The APA requires that "notice of proposed rule making ... be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise 
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988) (emphasis ad· 
ded). Thus, absent a showing by the agency of actual notice by some other means, a court 
may invalidate or remand a rule not preceded by notice in the Federal Register. See, e.g., 
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1249-51 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
39. Kerwin refers to an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) study completed dur-
ing the Carter Administration finding that the Federal Register is not a completely reliable 
method of agency outreach to potential participants. Pp. 174-75. Agencies have since exper-
imented with more accessible and understandable media, such as newspapers, radio, and 
mass mailings. P. 176. 
An annual subscription to the Federal Register costs $494 ($375 on-line, $433 microfiche). 
As of January 1995, it had 13,750 subscribers. Telephone Interview with General Accounting 
Office Marketing Department (Mar. 14, 1995). Interestingly, the Federal Register periodi· 
cally offers free three-hour briefings, open to the public, on the Federal Register system and 
the development of regulations. 
40. Legally, any party whosoever may answer a notice of proposed rulemaking by send-
ing comments to. the agency developing the rule. But any party seeking to affect the shape of 
the final rule must have information that adds to the agency's stock of useful information. 
41. P. 161 ("To the extent that rulemaking has political legitimacy, it derives from the 
right of affected interests to present facts and arguments to an agency under procedures 
designed to ensure the rationality of the agency's decision." (quoting Harter, supra note 25, 
at 17)). 
42. See, e.g., pp. 57, 80, 161, 171. 
43. See, e.g., pp. 54, 165. 
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participation in rulemaking only by those subject to the rules might 
compromise, rather than advance, agencies' political legitimacy. 
One cannot safely assume that those who will bear the costs of final 
rules will provide agencies with reliable information about early 
versions of those rules.44 Information about the quality of informa-
tion is one type of advantage outside parties may have over agen-
cies. To the extent that participation by regulated parties results in 
rules predicated on skewed or incomplete information strategically 
provided by those parties, participation exacerbates rather than 
ameliorates concerns about political legitimacy. 
More serious, perhaps, is the threat that regulated parties will 
enjoy illicit influence. Rather than take advantage of their better 
information, private parties might cooperate with agencies to de-
velop rules that, at the extreme, advance the private interests of 
those parties and undermine the legislation upon which the rules 
are based. Rent-seeking by regulated interests sometimes entails 
agency collaboration. 
None of this is to suggest, however, that informed parties will 
enjoy influence, illicit or otherwise, on an agency's development of 
a rule in any given case. First, agencies act largely at their own 
discretion concerning the weight they will attach, if any, to informa-
tion received during a rule's development. Setting aside agencies' 
own interests in generating the most informed rules, nothing else -
certainly not the APA - compels agencies to do anything but ig-
nore parties' input.45 More important, an agency's choice among 
possible rules is influenced by more than its exchange of informa-
tion with informed outside parties. After all, rulemaking hardly 
takes place in a political vacuum; agencies also respond to stimuli 
from Congress, the White House, and even the courts in the course 
of developing rules - hence the link to Kerwin's third element of 
rulemaking, accountability. 
Accountability is two-edged. Insofar as the forces to whom 
agencies are accountable seek to 'advance general interests, greater 
accountability is desirable. Here accountability helps ensure that 
rulemakers stay within proper bounds. Insofar as the forces to 
whom agencies are accountable seek rules that benefit narrow in-
terests to the greater detriment of general interests, on the other 
44. Though Kerwin seems to do so at one point: "First, industrJ, broadly defined, is the 
most reliable source of information on its own processes, and products." P. 102. 
45. The possibility of ex post judicial review helps to ensure that agencies do not ignore 
relevant data, however. Courts review agencies' rules, pursuant to APA§ 706(2)(A}-(D}, by 
applying a fairly deferential "arbitrary [or] capricious" standard, according to which a rule 
must have a "rational" evidentiary basis. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs: Assn. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983}; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.}, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
941 (1976). 
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hand, greater accountability is undesirable. Here accountability fa-
cilitates illicit influences on rulemakers. And the nature of over-
sight that each branch of government exercises over agencies, and 
thus over rulemaking processes, in turn depends on who partici-
pates in rulemaking and with what information they do so. 
No doubt, this analysis oversimplifies; information, participa-
tion, and accountability are related in even more complicated ways 
than described. One can begin to specify those ways, as Kerwin 
does, based on perfectly plausible assumptions about such matters 
as: whether private participants in rulemaking processes more 
often represent broad or narrow interests; whether agency person-
nel usually act to further their own conceptions of the public inter-
est or instead collaborate with regulated parties in some quid pro 
quo; whether Congress and the White House seek to shape 
rulemaking processes to promote general interests or to please nar-
row but powerful constituencies; and whether agencies are highly 
responsive to congressional signals or instead merely placate con-
cerned congressmembers until they tum their attention elsewhere. 
And these include but a few of the questions that must be answered 
before one can fully unpack the relationships among information, 
participation, and accountability. But while one can make plausible 
assumptions about such matters ad infinitum, even the most sensi-
ble postulations can further the understanding of rulemaking only 
so far. Sooner or later, one must turn to data on how rulemaking 
processes really work. Unfortunately, however, facts on informa-
tion, participation, and accountability are quite scarce. 
Fortunately, Kerwin understands this perfectly wefl,46 as 
Rulemaking demonstrates. In it, Kerwin furthers what is known 
about these elements, participation in particular, by making several 
small but significant contributions to the body of empirical work on 
rulemaking. First, Kerwin conducted a survey of agencies asking 
agency personnel how rulemaking processes were managed by their 
particular agency.47 Among other things, he found that for 63% of 
agencies, prior authorization from senior agency management is re-
quired to begin a rulemaking; that 70% of agencies occasionally use 
outside contractors during the development of a rule to supplement 
the agencies' own expertise; that only one of the thirty-five agencies 
46. Dean of the public policy school at American University, Kerwin is also an accom-
plished political scientist. Former Chair of the American Political Science Association's Sec-
tion on Public Admiilistration, he and a colleague (Professor Laura Langbein) were recently 
enlisted by the EPA to undertake a comprehensive empirical study of negotiated rulemaking 
to assist the Agency in carrying out its assessment of negotiated rulemaking as a decision-
making technique. In short, Kerwin is an empiricist as well as a thoughtful commentator. 
See, e.g., Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test 
of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 113 (1992). 
47. He also consulted agency guidance documents and practice books, whenever avail-
able, setting forth internal guidelines of agency rulemaking. P. 128, app. B. 
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surveyed informs interested members of Congress of the progress 
being made during the development of a rule; and that only two 
agencies allow their staff involved in a rulemaking to maintain a 
liaison with the OMB (p. 144). Little follows from these facts 
alone, but the survey provides one useful starting point for further 
consideration of intra-agency rulemaking processes and of the rela-
tionship between those processes and presidential, public, and con-
gressional oversight. Specifically, Kerwin's survey of agencies 
raises several questions worthy of follow-up research; For example: 
If in most agencies prior authorization from agency management is 
required to initiate a rulemaking, does that authorization usually 
come from political appointees or instead from senior agency bu- · 
reaucrats? To what extent does agency reliance on contractors test 
the limits of nondelegation? And how do the White House and 
Congress influence the development of a rule if the rulemaking 
staff of most agencies does not communicate with members of Con-
gress or the OMB during the rule's development? 
Of course, the results of Kerwin's survey of agencies speak to 
the rulemaking process from agencies' vantage p9int. Kerwin also 
sheds light on the issue of participation in those processes by 
outside groups. First, in an effort to gauge the extent to which 
rulemaking triggers participation from outside groups, Kerwin ana-
lyzed all rules published in the Federal Register from December 
1990 through June 1991. This seven-month period (chosen ran-
domly) generated a total of 1985 rules (p. 193). Relying on infor-
mation in the rules' preambles,48 Kerwin calculated for each month 
in question the percentage of rules that had been preceded by a 
notice of proposed rulemaking and, more important, the percentage 
of rules preceded by a notice of proposed rulemaking that actually 
generated comments from outside parties. He found that notice of 
proposed rulemaking preceded 43 % of the examined rules,49 and 
that 60% percent of those triggered commentary (p. 195). 
Kerwin's 60% figure is indicative of the overall frequency of 
participation in notice-and-comment rulemaking, but reveals little 
about how participation in rulemaking ranks relative to other forms 
of political participation. To address this issue, Kerwin conducted a 
survey of Washington-based interest groups, asking the groups 
48. See supra note 38. 
49. Given that § 553 requires notice of a rulemaking, Kerwin's 43% figure seems surpris-
ingly low, as he observes. Kerwin hypothesizes that some of the 1985 rules were exempted 
from notice requirements. Almost certainly this accounts for much of the gap, as interpretive 
and procedural rules do not require prior notice. See supra note 10. As Kerwin also points 
out, final rules may not always reflect prior notice. Kerwin suggests, however, that agencies 
may not always follow notice requirements, noting that other studies also suggest some pat-
tern of noncompliance with the notice requirement of § 553. P. 193 •. At any rate, examina-
tion of the text from a sample of Kerwin's set of rules would clarify this matter. 
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(among other things) how they compared the importance of their 
participation in rulemaking to their participation in lobbying, litiga-
tion, and grassroots organization, and how much of their annual 
budget they committed to rulemaking. Of the one hundred and 
eighty groups that responded, a substantial majority reported that 
they considered their rulemaking activities to be of equal or greater 
importance than lobbying activities (66.9% ), grassroots political 
work (67.2%), political contributions (69.9%), and litigation 
(78.6%) (p. 194). Kerwin also found that participation in rulemak-
ing varies across different types of interest groups. Ninety percent 
of trade associations, 88% of business groups, and 80% of labor 
unions responding to the survey indicated that they participate in 
rulemaking activities, while only 59% .of citizens' groups - con-
sumer groups and environmental groups - indicated that they par-
ticipate in rulemaking (p. 196): Further, citizens' groups allocate on 
average 9.4% of their annual budgets to rulemaking, while trade 
associations and business groups allocate 15.5% and 17.3%, respec-
tively (p. 197). 
Providing a glimpse of what kinds of comments interest groups 
communicate to agencies, Kerwin reports that of those groups that 
participate in rulemaking, 83.4 % suggested that they "almost al-
ways" raise issues concerning the quality of information supporting 
a proposed rule, while 77.2% indicated that they almost always 
raise concerns about the cost of complying with the rule, but only 
27.5% indicated that they almost always question the rulemaking 
agency's legal authority to issue the rule.so Finally, Kerwin's survey 
taps interest groups' perceptions about the efficacy of their partici-
pation in rulemaking. Of the groups that participate in rulemaking, 
15.9% indicated that they consider their participation successful -
where success means having some influence on the final shape of 
the rule - merely one-quarter of the time, 40.9% indicated that 
they consider their participation successful one-half of the time, and 
a full 42.4 % indicated that they consider their participation success-
ful three-quarters of the time (p. 209). Kerwin's data do not cap-
ture groups' perceptions about the magnitude - perceived or real 
- of their influence on the development of rules, but it is notewor-
thy that groups believe that participation in rulemaking so often has 
some real impact on the development of rules sufficient to justify 
the cost of participating. 
To be sure, one must he cautious about drawing strong conclu-
sions from Kerwin's data. His analysis of rules promulgated in the 
50. P. 198. In addition, Kerwin reports that 75.4% of the groups that participate in 
rulemaking suggested that they almost always raise concerns about the clarity of proposed 
rules, 85.6% raise concerns about compliance options, and 72.5% address the time for com-
pliance with proposed rules. P. 198. 
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Federal Register does not distinguish between legislative rules on 
one hand and interpretive and procedural rules on the other. And 
his survey data also must be approached mindful of the dangers 
associated with survey data.51 Even so, properly understood, both 
Kerwin's analysis of almost two thousand rules and his, extensive 
survey of Washington interest groups provide real. insight into who 
actually participates in rulemaking, to what extent, and with what 
concerns. These contributions alone would render Rulemaking a 
significant addition to the scholarship on rulemaking. Together 
with its survey of agencies and its helpful overview of the basic his-
torical, legal, and political dimensions of rJlemaking, Rulemaking is 
a welcome source even to those already familiar with rulemaking's 
basics. 
Not to oversell the book, Rulemaking does have its soft spots, in 
addition to its overtaxing of the concept of public participation. For 
one, its logic is occasionally rather loose. For example, throughout 
the book Kerwin argues as if the premise that delegation of legisla-
tive authority is necessary - given the demands of the American 
citizenry, on one hand, and the scarcity of time and other resources 
Congress faces, on the other hand - compels the conclusion that 
rulemaking is necessary. Indeed, the necessity of rulemaking is a 
leitmotif of Rulemaking. 52 But Congress could respond to the great 
demands placed upon it in other ways; assuming delegation is nec-
essary, Congress need not necessarily delegate rulemaking power 
specifically. And even if delegating some kind of rulemaking power 
were inevitable, still rulemaking in its current particular form is not 
indispensable.53 Nevertheless, Kerwin several times suggests that 
the subject of Rulemaking - notice-and-comment rulemaking with 
supplemental statutory overlays - is a linchpin of U.S. democ-
racy.54 Perhaps Kerwin's mistake is a consequence of the fact that 
rulemaking just so happens to be the primary form in which agen-
cies delegated lawmaking powers exercise those powers: Taking 
congressional delegation of lawmaking power to be unavoidable, 
and then observing that delegation so often takes the form of rule-
making power, Kerwin seems to conclude that rulemaking is inevi-
table. But to establish that rulemaking, as opposed to other forms 
of exercising delegated powers -. including other imaginable spe-
cies of rulemaking - is indispensable, Kerwin would have to pro-
vide some argument suggesting that rulemaking currently makes 
possible what no other mode of agency decisionmaking does. 
51. For one thing, survey respondents may have incentives to provide particular answers, 
as Kerwin observes. P. 208. 
52. See, e.g., pp. 27, 29-30, 161. 
53. After all, rulemaking as we know it is not a feature of all other modem democracies. 
54. See, e.g., pp. 27, 161, 293. 
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Familiar collective action and principal-agent models together 
provide one framework helpful for understanding both the strength 
of Kerwin's position that delegation is necessary and the vulnerabil-
ity of his position that rulemaking is necessary. The necessity of 
legislative delegation stems, in part, from the collective action 
problems Congress faces. Because individual legislators have their 
own personal sets of interests, goals, and ambitions, and because 
these do not always overlap with the interests, goals, and ambitions 
of Congress collectively, single members seldom have powerful in-
centives to contribute to - what are for Congress as a whole -
collective goods. More concretely, individual members of Congress 
typically have little incentive to invest the resources necessary to 
become experts about, for example, pending legislation concerning 
the effects of a particular carcinogen on the environment,ss So 
Congress does just what the citizenry, facing the same collective ac-
tion problems and interrelated time and information constraints, 
does: It delegates power. Just as the citizenry must delegate power 
to Congress, so Congress must delegate power to agencies. The leg-
islature thus empowers the EPA to study carcinogens so that indi-
vidual members can pursue other goals. 
But delegation introduces problems of its own. Perhaps most 
important, those to whom power is delegated - the agents in a 
principal-agent relationship - often have interests, goals, and am-
bitions of their own that may diverge from those of the delegators 
- the principals. Principals may attempt to develop safeguards to 
help ensure that agents do not further their own interests at the 
expense of their principals' interests. As Kerwin discusses (pp. 216-
29), Congress employs several oversight techniques to monitor 
agencies. But any such oversight mechanisms are costly, and, more-
over, they introduce collective action problems anew, as the moni-
toring of agents of multiple principals is itself a collective good. 
The question thus becomes whether rulemaking solves more collec-
tive action problems than the agency problems it creates. And if 
the answer to this question is yes from Congress's vantage point, is 
it also yes from the citizenry's vantage point, given that congres-
sional delegation of rulemaking power may make it more difficult 
for the citizenry to monitor its agents in Congress?S6 On these 
questions, Rulemaking provides little guidance. 
Second, Kerwin resists drawing certain inferences that his data 
make tenable. Specifically, his survey results indicating that citi-
55. Certainly Congress as an institution faces other constraints, such as scarcity of time, 
information, and other resources. But these constraints in tum are very closely related to the 
problem of collective action. 
56. Perhaps revealingly, Kerwin at one point leaves out the citizenry, the "first" principal 
in the principal-agent chain, when discussing the advantages rulemaking brings to the main 
actors in the political system. Pp. 32-35. • 
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zens' groups allocate roughly 9% of their average budgets to 
rulemaking while business groups allocate roughly 17% of theirs, 
coupled with the results that interest groups as a whole perceive 
that participation in rulemaking is efficacious, suggest that business 
and trade groups enjoy greater influence on the development of 
rules than do consumer groups. One cannot conclude as much deci-
sively, but Kerwin's data are highly suggestive, especially remem-
bering first that the absolute size of business groups' budgets almost 
certainly greatly exceeds the size of consumer groups' budgets,57 
and moreover that business groups outnumber consumer groups.58 
In absolute dollars, then, business groups expend many more re-
sources on participation in rulemaking - participation that interest 
groups generally perceive to be worth the costs.59 
Yet, Kerwin resists drawing any tentative conclusions about lop-
sided influence in rulemaking, suggesting instead that perhaps 
"businesses and trade associations are so frequently threatened by 
rulemaking that comparatively fewer can afford to devote their at-
tention elsewhere" (p. 199). He further suggests that the fact that a 
high percentage of participating groups report that they raise com-
pliance concerns may account for the mere appearance of the over-
representation of business interests; other groups, the argument 
goes, do not have a great stake in compliance matters. But surely 
compliance concerns are not unique to business interests, although 
the direction of their concerns probably is. That is, business groups 
seem most likely to be concerned that compliance options are too 
few, compliance time is too short, and compliance costs are too 
high, but environmental groups often have a mirror-image set of 
concerns: complifill:ce options are not strict enough, the compliance 
time frame is too long, and so on. Moreover, if compliance con-
cerns really are unique to business interests, then Kerwin's point 
here is circular: It begs the question why so many groups who have 
compliance concerns - that is, business groups - are those who 
57. See, e.g., SENATE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CoNG., lsr SESS., PuB-
uc PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS 17-22 (Comm. Print 1977); 
Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Ad-
ministrative Process, 60 GEo. LJ. 525, 526-29 (1972). 
58. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 66-69, 75-78 (1986); see also p. 197. 
59. To the extent that trade associations represent business interests, the fact that busi-
ness groups and trade associations are categorized separately further understates the differ-
ence in magnitude of resources that fuels business and consumer-environmental 
participation. Although Kerwin's data are not decisive on the question, taken together they 
strongly suggest that business-oriented interests enjoy much more influence in rulemaking 
processes. On the other hand, however, one cannot assume that business interests are ho-
mogenous. Rivalries among business interests, and perhaps especially between big-business 
and small-business interests, no doubt often pit business-oriented interests against one an-
other. For that matter, one cannot assume that consumer and environmental interests are 
homogenous, though they seem likely to be more so than do business interests. 
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participate so much in rulemaking. Either way, the observation 
that a high percentage of groups that participate in rulemaking raise 
compliance issues does not ameliorate concerns about the extent of 
business-oriented groups' influence on rulemaking processes rela-
tive to that of other groups. 
Third, some of Rulemaking's discussion is too rudimentary to be 
of much use to most readers. Kerwin spends a couple of pages, for 
instance, explaining that federal judges are appointed for life, that 
the federal court system has three tiers including a Supreme Court 
composed of nine members, and that because federal judges may 
have been appointed by presidents of a different political party 
from the one in power at any given time, there may be division 
among the branches about what constitutes desirable regulatory 
policy.60 More distracting for lawyers, perhaps, is the fact that some 
of Kerwin's legal analysis is simplistic. For instance, although 
Kerwin rightly observes that those who would challenge a rule in 
federal court must first overcome several legal hurdles, his discus-
sion of judicial review in the penultimate chapter of the book seems 
to conflate jurisdiction with standing with sovereign immunity with 
timin. . 61 g. 
60. Pp. 251-53. For another example, Kerwin explains at length what leaders and mem-
bers of working groups within agencies should keep in mind to perform their jobs effectively. 
Pp. 150-58. The tone of the passage strongly suggests Kerwin is addressing agency working-
group personnel. • 
61. Pp. 254-56. Kerwin states that § 702 of the APA is a "prominent example of congres-
sional encouragement of a more liberal doctrine of standing .... [in which] Congress ex-
tended judicial review to 'persons aggrieved' by a given agency decision." P. 254 (quoting 
from § 702). But § 702 neither extends judicial review nor grants standing. Section 702 
waives sovereign immunity for suits seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. It also creates a 
cause of action for any person "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). But any such person must 
still overcome the usual constitutional and prudential standing hurdles, see, e.g., Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871 
(1990); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 {1978), which exist 
independent of the APA. As for judicial review, Congress extended judicial review over 
agency actions in § 704, which states, in relevant part: "Agency action made reviewable by 
statute and final agency action ••. are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) 
(emphasis added). For approximately three decades following the passage of the APA, § 704 
was considered - often implicitly - jurisdictional. But since the elimination of the amount-
in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 {1988), it is § 1331 - not § 704 - that ex-
tends judicial review over agency action when agencies' own statutes do not. Califano v • 
. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977). Today, the main substance of§ 704 is its imposition of a 
finality requirement "on top of" § 1331. As the language of§ 704 suggests, finality is, strictly 
speaking, jurisdictional, though Kerwin seems to suggest that finality is a judicially-developed 
timing doctrine (p. 256) perhaps confusing finality with the exhaustion doctrine. 
Kerwin also conflates judicial review of the factual basis of an agency's rule, on one hand, 
and judicial review of an agency's interpretation of the statute that authorizes the agency to 
engage in rulemaking, on the other hand. He thus argues that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), and the 
Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), manifest "strongly contrasting views of the role courts should assume when con-
sidering challenges to agency rulemaking." P. 260. These cases, however, presented rather 
different legal questions. In State Farm, the Court stated that a rule will be found arbitrary 
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The worst of Rulemaking's few vices, however, is its belated 
treatment of "theory." Not until the last chapter does Kerwin turn 
to theories of rulemaking. Oddly, he begins with an apologia for 
the discussion to come: 
Practical, pragmatic readers are no doubt casting a wary eye on 
the title of this final chapter ["Rulemaking: Theories and Reform 
Proposals"]. They likely value facts, cold-eyed realism, and a 
problem-solving attitude. For many, "theory" connotes a painfully 
abstract or irrelevant academic exercise too removed from the 
problems of the real world to help those who must live with them, or 
try to solve them. [p. 271] 
He then goes on to justify the topic in entirely unobjectionable but, 
one would have thought, unnecessary terms: . 
[A] theory of rulemaking is not a luxury [but] an indispensable tool 
for all students of rulemaking, whether their interests. lie in scholar-
ship or practice. 
. . . Whatever the motivation of those who would change the 
rulemaking process ... they should. at least be sure that the actions 
they contemplate are likely to produce the results they desire. [pp. 
270-71] 
Indubitably. Empirical work uninformed by theory is no more use-
ful than theory ungrounded by empirical .work. 
But having justified his turn to theory, Kerwin treats the subject 
at once too broadly and too narrowly. On one hand, he argues that 
a theory of rulemaking must answer three questions: (i). Why has 
rulemaking come to play a crucial role in lawmaking? (ii) What de-
termines rulemaking's results? and (iii) What are the implications 
of rulemaking for our constitutional system? With these tests in 
mind, Kerwin further argues that a "review of what we know about 
each of these questions strongly suggests that a comprehensive the-
ory of rulemaking is well within our grasp" (p. 272). As his ques-
tions suggest, however, he really has in mind several distinct types 
of theories - historical theories explaining the evolution of the in-
stitution, predictive theories explaining the form that final rules 
take today, and legal theories justifying the existence of rulemaking 
agencies constitutionally. Each of these is interesting and impor-
tant, but only the second is essential for the scholar and practitioner 
whom Kerwin addresses at the beginning of his chapter. One could 
enjoy a successful scholarly or political career with a deep under-
and capricious if an agency fails to provide an adequate basis for it or, worse, offers an expla-
nation that runs counter to the available evidence. 463 U.S. at 43. In Chevron, the Court 
stated that where a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular interpretive 
question, an agency will enjoy judicial deference toward its interpretation of that provision, 
so long as that interpretation is reasonable. 467 U.S. at 842·45. Both cases involved chal-
lenges to agency rules, but the nature of the challenges, and of the judicial resolutions of 
them, was distinct in each case. 
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standing of what determines the results of the rulemaking process 
- knowing exactly which variables most account for the form final 
rules take - and only an elementary understanding of the history 
and constitutional position of rulemaking agencies. 62 
Moreover, even assuming that Kerwin has identified the proper 
measures for assessing a theory of rulemaking, his claim that a com-
prehensive theory of rulemaking is within our grasp seems quite 
sanguine in light of his treatment of each of those measures. As for 
why rulemaking occurs and what the constitutional implications of 
rulemaking are, Kerwin has little to say. On the latter subject, he 
simply notes that the health of democracy depends upon how well 
rulemaking works.63 On why rulemaking occurs, Kerwin goes on at 
some length, but his functionalist account - he explains how 
rulemaking serves the interests of its participants, the Congress, the 
President, the courts, and interest groups - does not go very far to 
distinguish rulemaking either from other institutions that might ac-
complish whatever rulemaking accomplishes or from other modes 
of agency decisionmaking. 
He writes of Congress, for instance: 
The growth of the federal government, particularly during this 
century, was b.oth the cause and the consequence of rulemaking .... 
Whether the growth of government since the onset of the Great De-
pression is a result of congressional responsiveness to unprompted 
constituency demands or due to the discovery of the electoral bullet-
proofing provided by pork, the effects on rulemaking are indisputa-
ble. Congress has always chosen to cede crucial elements of the de-
sign and Virtually all implementation of thousands of programs to 
rulemaking. Overwhelmed by demands from the public or by their · 
own ambition, it was clear to the members of every Congress since 
the first that they could not provide in statutes all that was needed to 
define and guide public policy. [p. 273] 
The fact that Congress "has always chosen" to delegate to 
rulemakers, however, does not tell us why they have done so. And 
whether they have done so to serve their constituency or to fuel 
reelection campaigns or for some alternative reason or complicated 
combination of reasons, is precisely what the question "Why does 
rulemaking ·occur?" seeks to ask. Granted, Kerwin does go on to 
say that others have argued that Congress has delegated rulemak-
ing power to avoid difficult political issues and to increase its capac-
ity to oversee agencies. But this raises more questions than it 
62. To be sure, there may be many reasons to be interested in both the history of 
rulemaking and the constitutional status of rulemaking agencies, but Kerwin does not iden· 
tify them when making his case that the scholar and practitioner alike should be concerned 
with theory. 
63. Earlier in the book, Kerwin observes that the Supreme Court eventually reconciled 
agencies' existence with the Constitution, but offers no analysis of the issue. Pp 47-48. 
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answers: Is the delegation of rulemaking power overdetermined? 
Why did Congress decide to use rulemaking in particular to avoid 
difficult political decisions? What about rulemaking makes it easier 
to oversee than other modes of agency decisionmaking - and how 
do we know? 
On the more central question of what determines the content of 
final rules, Kerwin's discussion is more developed. Here he out-
lines the basic tenets of competing predictive theories of rulemak-
ing, explaining the basic division between the "bur~au-dominance" 
school as~ociated with Niskane:D.64 - according to which agencies 
are the dominant partner in the Congress-agency relationship, able 
to further their own interests with little threat of detection by Con-
gress - and the "principal-agent" school associated with Noll and 
Weingast65 - according to which Congress has at its disposal sev-
eral tools for keeping agencies' activities in line with congressional 
demands. On this question, however, Kerwin argues, persuasively,. 
that more empirical work needs to be done before much confidence 
can be given to any answer to the question of what explains the 
results of rulemaking (pp. 291-92). Even if the debate about 
whether Congress dominates agencies or agencies dominate Con-
gress were completely resolved - and surely the truth is some-
where in between - one would still need to know how, for 
· example, Congress controls agencies. Which oversight techniques 
are effective, and in what circumstances? In response to what stim-
uli do various forces in Congress employ those techniques? In 
short, what is the set of variables most relevant to explaining the 
form final rules take? As Kerwin recognizes, indeed emphasizes, 
these are all open questions. Th.us, if Kerwin is right that a compre-
hensive understanding of rulemaking is within grasp, certainly a 
very long reach is required. 
III. THE FUTURE OF SCHOLARSHIP ON RuLEMAKING 
Also missing from Kerwin's chapter on theory is an explicit 
treatment of normative theory. Th.is is not a criticism, but rather an 
observation about Rulemaking's scope. Kerwin does close his book 
64. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BuREAUCR.1-CY AND REPREsENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT (1971). 
65. See Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 
AM. J. Pm .. SCI. 588 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as In-
struments of Political Contro~ 3 J.L EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 243 (1987); Mathew D. Mc-
Cubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative A"angements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 15 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. 
Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the 
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Por .. EcoN. 765 (1983}; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Organi-
zational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RGANI-
ZA TION 93 (1992). For a critique, see Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 
'Congressional Dominance,' 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987). 
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with a brief discussion of several rulemaking reform proposals, but 
without connecting these proposals to their corresponding visions 
of what rulemaking should look like, notwithstanding that every re-
form proposal necessarily presupposes a commitment to some alter-
native regime deemed more preferable than the system of 
rulemaking we now know .. Nor does Kerwin develop at any length 
his own normative account of rulemaking. 
And yet, on one level, a normative vision of rulemaking per-
vades Kerwin's book; it is the subtext of Rulemaking. Throughout 
the book, Kerwin implies that rulemaking becomes more desirable 
as rulemaking agencies become more accountable to those whose 
interests are implicated by proposed rules. Accountability, again, 
takes direct and indirect forms. Agencies are directly accountable 
to the extent that rulemaking processes themselves are amenable to 
participation by all implicated interests; agencies are indirectly ac-
countable to the extent that effective congressional and presidential 
oversight advances those interests. Kerwin's own rulemaking re-
forms, then, appear between the lines, and on a high level of ab-
straction: Reform measures that would render rulemaking 
processes more open to participation, and - to the extent that 
Congress and the President are themselves sufficiently accountable 
to their constituencies to ensure that their oversight of agencies fur-
thers all implicated parties' interests - reform measures that 
would render agencies more accountable to Congress and the 
White House would be desirable. 
Kerwin never calls for reform directly, but the general message 
that greater accountability both improves the quality of final rules 
and enhances the political legitimacy of rulemaking as an institution 
pervades his overlapping discussions of information, participation, 
and accountability.66 For example, in an early passage on "mecha-
nisms of accountability," Kerwin notes that rulemakers are subject 
to layers of constraints imposed by the other branches, and suggests 
that the most problematic aspect of accountability is that those con-
straints sometimes conflict with one another (pp. 70-71). The mere 
fact that rulemakers are constrained by the other branches does not 
worry Kerwin because he assumes that Congress and the President 
are in turn accountable to their constituencies.67 Were Congress 
and the President not accountable to their constituencies, one 
would have to consider whether their oversight constituted a cor-
66. At one· point, Kerwin writes: "The opportunity to participate in the development of 
rules lends the process an element of democracy not present in other forms of lawmaking." 
P. 65. 
67. The assumption is explicit Kerwin writes: "Congress is driven by the interest of con· 
stituents and expects those who write rules to be responsive to them as well ••.• The presi-
dent is driven by what he perceives to be his mandate from the entire electorate or at least 
those segments who supported him." P. 71. 
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rupting force on rulemaking. But Kerwin skips over this issue and 
examines coordination among those to whom agencies are account-
able. Later, Kerwin relaxes the assumption that the White House is 
accountable to the citizenry, and only then does he suggest that 
presidential oversight is not unambiguously desirable (pp. 239, 248). 
To the extent that oversight is a proxy for participation, and only to 
that extent, is more accountability to the elective branches better.68 
For another example illustrative of Kerwin's attitude toward 
participation, Kerwin states in his introduction to the chapter on 
the subject that participation both enables agencies to gather 
needed information and generates greater compliance by those who 
have participated in the development of a rule (pp. 161-62). The 
implications for rulemaking here are apparent: All else equal, inno-
vations to rulemaking procedures that would facilitate participation 
and accountability would improve the rulemaking regime. Of 
course, the gains of any such improvements would have to be bal-
anced against whatever disadvantages heightened participation and 
greater accountability might bring. But participation and accounta-
bility, at least taken alone, are desirable. 
Although the subtext of Rulemaking thus reveals Kerwin's gen-
eral normative orientation, the book contains no specific prescrip-
tions for nuts-and-bolts changes to existing rulemaking processes. 
Nowhere does Kerwin explain how particular rulemaking proce-
dures should be changed to facilitate participation. And nowhere 
does he explain exactly how congressional· or presidential oversight 
mechanisms should be strengthened. 69 This stands to reason, for 
Rulemaking also supplies - again between the lines - a critique 
of nearly all rulemaking reforms, given the current state of knowl-
edge ·about how actual rulemaking processes work, and to whose 
benefit and at whose cost. This is true because most reform propos-
als presuppose not only a normative theory about what rulemaking 
should look like, but also a fairly well-developed understanding of 
what rulemaking in fact looks like. Indeed, reformers intended pre-
cisely to narrow the gap between what the regime looks like and 
what it should look like. But as already explained, and as Kerwin 
himself repeatedly points out, a robust descriptive theory about 
how rulemaking actually works must await the future. Conse-
quently, great confidence in specific reform proposals must await 
the future as well. Should rulemaking procedures provide greater 
68. Kerwin's nonnative orientation resurfaces again at the end of the book, at which 
point he argues that rulemaking cannot be fully understood divorced from the larger political 
system of which it is part and that to seek "fundamental reform [of] rulemaking without 
reform of these larger institutions and forces is futile." P. 296. 
69. Indeed, Kerwin is somewhat ambivalent about congressional and presidential over-
sight, given that oversight can be used to further special interests at the greater expense of 
general interests. 
1534 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1511 
avenues for public participation in the form of more demanding no-
tice requirements, for example? Maybe, depending on the extent to 
which existing notice requirements adequately inform the public, 
who is already participating, and the consequences of such partici-
pation.70 At the moment, too little is known about these matters to 
say with confidence. 
Nevertheless, rulemaking reform proposals with committed 
sponsors abound. In the wake of the last congressional election -
and since the appearance of Rulemaking - reform proposals to 
change rulemaking processes have become highly salient. The lat-
est version of the House of Representative's regulatory-reform bill 
- the "Regulatory Reform and Relief Act,"71 a subdivision of the 
"Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act"72 - would alter cur-
rent rulemaking procedures substantially. Under the proposed act, 
agencies would be required, for example: to promulgate in the Fed-
eral Register a notice of intent to propose a rule ninety days prior to 
proposing a rule, to publish concurrently with all "major"73 pro-
posed rules a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" setting forth estimated 
costs and benefits of the proposed rule, to hold a public hearing on 
any proposed rule that generated comments from one hundred or 
more individuals ("acting individually"), to extend the period for 
comment by thirty days any time one hundred or more individuals 
request such an extension,74 and to publish with final rules the 
70. A better understanding of how rulemaking works is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to justify enthusiasm in particular reform proposals. Also required is some way to 
balance the sometimes competing values and norms that animate reform proposals. For ex-
ample, increased notice requirements might advance the goal of generating greater participa-
tion in rulemaking by parties previously uninformed about agencies' agendas, but such notice 
requirements might also extend the time period required to complete a rule, thus thwarting 
the goal of agency efficiency. As Kerwin points out, trade-offs are necessary. Pp. 118, 178, 
181. 
71. H.R. 926, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
72. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
73. As of this writing, H.R. 9 defines "major rule" as: 
any rule subject to section 553(c) [of the APA] that is likely to result in -
(A) an annual effect on the economy of $50,000,000 or more; 
(B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, 
State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions, or 
(C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productiv-
ity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with 
foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets .•.. 
H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1995) (emphasis added). 
74. The bill's provision for extending the period for comment reads: "[The agency] ... 
shall provide an additional 30-day period for making those submissions •••• " H.R. 9, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1995) (emphasis added). But the APA provides no thirty-day period 
currently. Rather, § 553 simply requires agencies to "give interested persons an opportunity 
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments." 5 
U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). The period for comment, then, is determined by the particular 
rulemaking agency's statute, policy, or practice. When agencies are not prescribed by law to 
allow a specific amount of time, courts consider the sufficiency of the time allowed for com-
ment using essentially a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. 
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agency's response to whatever substantive comments it received. 
These particular reform proposals are new only in their partisan 
packaging. Students of administrative law, representing a wide 
range of the political spectrum, have long argued for various re-
forms of rulemaking processes.75 But as Kerwin rightly observes 
(pp. 89-90), and as the general tenor of Rulemaking implies, reform 
proposals risk committing the nirvana fallacy to the extent that they 
are not supported by a robust descriptive theory of rulemaking.76 , 
This is not at all to argue that students of administrative regula-
tion currently know nothing about how rulemaking processes actu-
ally work, or that debates over various rulemaking reform 
proposals are hopelessly uninformed.77 Empirical work is not new 
United States, 846 F.2d 765, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that 15-day comment period not 
unreasonable in specific circumstance of the case), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1045 (1989). The 
bill's provision seems born of confusion for the second reason that President Clinton's Exec-
utive Order 12,866, supra" note 22, already instructs agencies to provide at least a 60-day 
period for comment. Id. § 6(a)(l), 3 C.F.R. at 644. 
75. See pp. 89-120. 
76. Admittedly, lack of understanding about how rulemaking processes actually work im-
plies a critique not only of fundamental reform proposals, but also of impassioned resistance 
to such proposals. After all, without great confidence in any descriptive theory of rulemak-
ing, who can say that a particular reform will deliver more harm than good? But see OMB 
WATCH, EYE OF nm NEwr: AN ANALYSIS OF nm JoB CREATION AND WAGE ENHANCE-
MENT Acr (1994) (providing a critical summary of the Republican reform effort by a public-
interest watchdog group); Gregory S. Wetstone, And Now, Regulatory Refonn, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1995, at A23 (critiquing House bill's regulatory reform measures). 
The minority view accompanying the House Report on H.R. 9, states: 
[The Democrats] strongly support the goal of improving federal regulatory programs 
through greater use of risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and peer review .... 
. . . The question is not whether regulatory reform is important - but rather how to 
achieve it in the most cost-effect and responsible manner . 
. . . H.R. 9 as reported will create many new layers of bureaucracy, clog the regula-
tory process, invite litigation, and impose substantial new costs on the federal treasury 
while doing little to improve the efficiency of our regulatory agencies. 
H.R. REP. No. 33, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1995). The Democrats may well be right. Inter-
estingly, however, two of the specific measures of the proposed Regulatory Reform and Re-
lief Act echo reforms of the Carter Administration during what Kerwin calls the 
"participation revolution" of the 1970s. P. 170. Executive Order 12,044, supra note 22, re-
quired agencies to provide advance notice of a proposed rulemaking and to provide for a 
comment period of at least 60 days. P. 174. At that time, such changes were undertaken by a 
different political party animated by a different ideology and motivated by a somewhat differ-
ent set of concerns. Kerwin cites a report that the OMB undertook to try to evaluate the 
effects of Executive Order 12,044's requirements that concluded that the effects of these two 
reforms were mixed and marginal. P. 175. 
77. It may be noteworthy, however, that one can find reasonable positions on either side 
of most reform debates. Consider, for example, the recommendation by Vice-President Gore 
and the National Performance Review - the successor to the Regulatory Analysis Review 
Groups (Carter Administration), the Task Force on Regulatory Relief (Reagan Administra-
tion), and the Competitiveness Council (Bush Administration) - that agencies make greater 
use of negotiated rulemaking. According to the Review's report, agencies should employ 
negotiated rulemaking processes more often because negotiated rulemaking results in faster 
rulemaking, greater consensus among interested parties, and, with the latter, less litigation. 
See AL GoRE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REvmw, FROM RED TAPE TO RESUL'IS: CREAT-
ING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETI'ER & Cosrs LESS 118-19, 167 (1993). Secretary 
Reich has also advocated greater reliance on negotiated rulemaking. See Robert B. Reich, 
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to students of administrative law.78 Anc:I important work on 
rulemaking in particular has already been done. In addition to the 
scholarship on the legal dimensions of rulemaking, scholars have 
completed significant work on information, participation, and ac-
countability in the context of a few particular rulemaking pro-
grams.79 There is also a substantial economics literature on the 
economic consequences of certain agency decisions.80 Thus, neither 
Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation?, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1981, at 82; An 
Introduction to Negotiated Rulemaking (U.S. Dept. of Labor video) (27-minute promotional 
video featuring Secretary Reich, among others, urging other agencies to explore negotiated 
rulemaking); see also ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COUNSEL, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, NEGOTIATED 
RuLEMA~G HANDBOOK 17 (1992) (explaining that negotiated rulemaking "shall be ac-
tively considered for use by all DOL agencies exploring the possibility of rulemaking"). 
Whether the Review's and the Labor Secretary's prescriptions are well founded, however, is 
difficult to say. For one thing, negotiated rulemaking quite possibly is well suited for 
rulemaking by agencies colfcerned with labor issues but ill-suited for rulemaking agencies 
generally. This is true because negotiated rulemaking raises general concerns about the rep-
resentativeness of those involved in the negotiation. To the extent that rulemaking by the 
Department of Labor implicates a small number of interests, labor and management, both of 
whom are traditionally well represented, generic concerns about the representativeness of · 
negotiated rulemakers may not be present. 
Absent systematic study, how do we know whether the net effects of negotiated rulemak-
ing are generally desirable relative to ordinary rulemaking? Thoughtful administrative law 
scholars who have considered the matter disagree about the promises and dangers of negoti-
ated rulemaking. Compare Harter, supra note 25, at 28-31 (advocating negotiated rulemak-
ing due to several benign consequences) with William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: 
Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest - EPA 's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 
55 (1987) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking tends to subvert the public interest to the 
benefit of private interests). This reasonable disagreement supports the case that more em-
pirical research is necessary. 
78. See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies on the Costs of Federal Statutory and Judicial 
Deadlines, 39 AoMIN. L. REv. 467 (1987); Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within 
Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1986); Linda 
R. Cohen & Matthew L Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 65 
(1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 
(1992); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE LI. 984; Williams, supra note 26; see also JERRY L. 
MAsHAW & DAVID L. liARFsr, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
79. See, e.g., MAGAT ET AL, supra note 34; THOMAS 0. McGARrIY, REINVENTING RA· 
TIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 27-176 
(1991); Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal 
Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEo. LI. 51 (1981); Funk, supra note 77; Cary Coglianese, 
Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative State (1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
80. Although this work seldom distinguishes explicitly among modes of agency decision-
making, often the context of the particular regulatory decision or policy makes clear whether 
an agency's decisions took the form of rules. For a few of many examples, see Ann P. Bartel 
& Lacy Glenn Thomas, Predatian Through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, 30 
J.L. & EcoN. 239 (1987); Shelby D. Gerking & William Schulze, What Do We Know About 
the Benefits of Reduced Mortality from Air Pollution Control?, AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS & 
PRoc. May 1981, at 228; Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The Social Cost of Gov-
ernment Regulation of Milk, 21 J.L & ECON. 33 (1978); John C. Panzar, Regulation, Deregu-
lation and Economic Efficiency: The Case of the CAB, AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS & PROC., 
May 1980, at 311; Nancy L Rose, The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier 
Industry, 16 RAND J. ECON. 299 (1985). 
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social scientists nor administrative law scholars seeking a deeper 
understanding of how rulemaking works need start from scratch.81 
Still in all, as Kerwin repeatedly observes,82 empirical work on 
rulemaking is relatively rare. Certainly compared to the literatures 
on such subjects as judicial review of agency rules, and compared 
also to recent advances in the application of formal methodological 
tools to questions that have long concerned administrative law 
scholars,&3 scholarly work examining who actually participates in 
rulemaking, how often, with what incentives, with what resources, 
81. Moreover, productive debates about such reforms as the increased use of cost-benefit 
analyses in evaluating proposed rules do not require deep understanding about how rulemak-
ing processes work. Although a cost-benefit proponent would need to know enough about 
rulemaking to know whether conducting cost-benefit assessments of proposed rules is feasi-
ble, one's position on normative questions about the most desirable aims of rulemaking need 
not depend on advanced understanding of how rulemaking works in practice. Fmally, one 
can always engage in spirited debate about which experimental rulemaking reforms to try 
next, though assessing the results of any experiment eventually requires some understanding 
of how rulemaking works. · 
82. See, e.g., p. 78 ("There is scant empirical evidence on the number of petitions [to 
make a rule] received [by agencies] and how they are ultimately disposed of."); p. 114 ("Lit· 
tle systematic research has been undertaken that might establish which of these many poten-
tial causes [of delay in rulemaking] are the most common or serious."); pp. 157-58 
("Although we have evidence of an enormous amount of management activity, we have little 
evidence of its effect on the rules that are finally issued .••. We simply lack most of the basic 
information needed to evaluate various levels and systems of managing rules."); p. 192 
("Analyses of official rulemaking records and surveys of interest groups pertaining specifi-
cally to their involvement in the development of rules. are as rare as hens' teeth."); see also 
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehi-
cle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987). According to Mashaw and Harfst, "The normative 
expectations of administrative lawyers have seldom been subjected to empirical verification 
of a more than anecdotal sort." ld. at 275. And as Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott add, 
"[D]ifferent observers •.. rely upon different anecdotes." Schuck & Elliott, supra note 78, at 
987; see also Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Be-
tween the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347 (1995) (attributing lack of 
empirical scholarship among legal academics in large part to lack of training, based on re-
sponses to telephone survey of law professors); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors 
Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL Eo. 323 (1989) (listing reasons why statistical 
inference is rare in legal scholarship and calling for more of it). 
83. See supra note 65; see also David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative Pro-
cedures, Information and Agency Discretion: Slack vs. Flexibility (June 1993) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Interest Group Over-
sight, Information and the Design of Administrative Procedures (Aug. 1993) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
In addition to axiomatic models based on or inspired by the principal-agent relationship, 
some scholars (chiefly Terry Moe) have begun to bring the insights of institutional economics 
to bear on agency behavior, providing yet further cause for excitement among students of 
administrative law. See Terry M. Moe, Interests, institutions, and Positive Theory: The Poli· 
tics of the NLRB, in 2 STUDIES IN AMERICAN Poun:CAL DEVELOPMENT 236 (1987); Terry M. 
Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. PoL. Scr. 739 (1984); Terry M. Moe, 
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION, Special 
Issue 1990, at 213; Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE Gov. 
ERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989). For an excellent explo-
ration and synthesis of the relationship between positive political theory, including the new 
institutionalism, on one hand, and some of administrative law scholars' traditional concerns, 
on the other hand, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory 
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and with what effect is sparse. More empirical work - whether 
surveys and descriptive statistics like Kerwin's or case studies or 
inferential statistics - would both complement recent advances in 
the field and lend needed grounding to ongoing reform debates. 
· CONCLUSION 
Kerwin begins his book by stating that "it is time for social 
scientists to match the effort and insights of legal scholars" in their 
attempt to understand rulemaking {p. xii). It is also time, one might 
add, for legal scholars to complement their understanding of 
rulemaking by integrating the social scientists' methodological tools 
in the pursuit of better understanding of how rulemaking actually 
works and, only then, how it might be made to work better. For 
although legal scholars' efforts have indeed yielded many insights in 
the rulemaking area, the legal scholarship has occasionally suffered 
from a lack of empirical grounding in social-science research meth-
ods, just as the social-science scholarship has occasionally suffered 
from a lack of understanding of the law that defines and shapes the 
political institutions many social scientists study. The happy mar-
riage of law and social science would make Rulemaking worthwhile 
under the terms Kerwin set: "[I]f it does nothing else, this book will 
be worthwhile if it prods other scholars to examine some phase of 
rulemaking" (p. 297). In the meantime, the book does do some-
thing else: For the newcomer, Rulemaking is a solid introduction to 
the subject; for administrative law scholars and administrative law-
yers, it is a sensible if simple overview that adds to what is known 
about making rules in an interesting and instructive way. 
